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A theoretical model is proposed that specifies lay causal theories of behavior; and
supporting experimental evidence is presented. The model’s basic assumption is that
different types of behavior trigger different hypotheses concerning the types of causes that
may have brought about the behavior. Seven categories are distinguished that are assumed
to serve as both behavior types and explanation types: goals, dispositions, temporary
states such as emotions, intentional actions, outcomes, events, and stimulus attributes.
The model specifies inference rules that lay people use when explaining behavior (actions
are caused by goals; goals are caused by higher order goals or temporary states; temporary
states are caused by dispositions, stimulus attributes, or events; outcomes are caused by
actions, temporary states, dispositions, stimulus attributes, or events; events are caused
by dispositions or preceding events). Two experiments are reported. Experiment 1 showed
that free-response explanations followed the assumed inference rules. Experiment 2
demonstrated that explanations which match the inference rules are generated faster and
more frequently than non-matching explanations. Together, the findings support models
that incorporate knowledge-based aspects into the process of causal explanation. The
results are discussed with respect to their implications for different stages of this process,
such as the activation of causal hypotheses and their subsequent selection, as well as with
respect to social influences on this process.
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INTRODUCTION
People are usually not content with merely taking notice of others’
behavior; they ask why others behave the way they do and try
to find explanations. Suppose, for example, that your next-door
neighbor surprises you with a present. You will most probably find
yourself wondering about why she does this. Is this simply a sign
of her positive affection for you? Does she want to make a friend?
Does she want to prepare you for an upcoming noisy party? Does
she have a crush on you? The way you explain her behavior may
affect not only your response to the gift, but also your attitude
toward your neighbor and how your relationship will develop.
The explanation of our own and others’ behavior is at the heart
of social functioning. Explanations shape the way in which people
make sense of the social world, how they perceive themselves and
others as well as how they regulate their own behavior and react
to others. The study of behavior explanations has traditionally
been undertaken in attribution theory, where the explanation of
a behavior has been conceived as consisting of the assignment of
one or more causes to the behavior (e.g., Heider, 1958; Jones and
Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967, 1973). While other types of explanation
exist (e.g., one can explain what a behavior is as in explaining a
local custom to a foreigner; Antaki and Fielding, 1981), causal
explanations are the most important type in that the vast majority
of everyday explanations involve causality and the causal elements
of an explanation are the parts that have the strongest influence on
perceptions and judgments (Keil, 2006).
The present article focuses on the question of how people
arrive at causal explanations of behavior and, more specifically,
how such causal explanations are guided by lay theories. It is
assumed that people hold implicit theories about what sorts of
factors can be potential causes for a certain type of behavior; for
example, that accomplishments can be brought about by high
ability or strong effort. The aim is to specify these lay theories and
identify which potential causes people consider when explaining
everyday behavior. This aim constitutes a return to Heider’s
(1958) seminal work that marks the origin of attribution research.
Heider’s approach contained two elements that have shaped
the field of social attribution research (Heider, 1958; Hilton,
2007): First, he postulated his naïve analysis of action in which
he specified the attributor’s prior causal knowledge and listed
concrete causal factors that perceivers are assumed to use when
explaining behavior (i.e., ability, effort, task difficulty, and luck).
Second, he introduced mechanisms of causal inference such as
covariation and discounting that guide the selection of one of
these causal factors as an explanation for a particular behavior.
Later work elaborated on the causal inference mechanisms, the
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most prominent approach being Kelley’s (1973) proposition of an
intuitive analysis of variance as a specification of the covariation
principle.
Heider’s idea of a lay causal theory of behavior has received less
attention in subsequent attribution research. Interestingly, even
though Heider (1958) introduced the notion of a lay psychology
and this is generally seen as the foundation of attribution theory,
work on lay theories seems more active in other areas of psycho-
logical research than in traditional attribution research. There is
abundant research on lay theories as beliefs about some specific
aspect of human experience (for a review see Levy et al., 2006),
for example implicit theories about the malleability of personal
attributes such as personality or intelligence (e.g., Plaks et al.,
2005). Approaches that investigate lay causal theories as basis of
causal explanations of behavior and try to specify concrete causal
factors (such as ability or effort) that people consider relevant
when explaining broad ranges of behavior, however, have been
relatively scarce (for exceptions see Anderson, 1983a; Malle, 1999,
2004, 2011).
Approaches in the tradition of attribution theory that do
address lay causal theories often look at them only with respect
to the person-situation distinction (Hansen, 1980; Ybarra, 2002;
Gawronski, 2004). That is, they only consider whether people
hold hypotheses about personal or situational causation; they do
not distinguish more specific causal factors within the person or
situation, such as ability or effort as factors within the person.
However, recent research has shown that when people try to
understand behavior, they do not so much ask whether it was due
to the person or the situation but rather which specific intention,
goal, motive, or disposition led to the behavior (Malle, 1999, 2004;
Malle et al., 2000; Kammrath et al., 2005). For example, Reeder
et al. (2004) found that the attribution of a disposition to an
actor could be better predicted from the specific motives that
are ascribed to the actor (e.g., whether she is seen as pursuing
obedient or selfish goals) than from global attributions of the
behavior to the person or the situation. Moreover, the content of
specific motives and dispositions that are attributed to a target
person has been found to be crucial for subsequent judgments
and behavioral predictions (Reeder et al., 2004; Kammrath et al.,
2005). These findings suggest that causal explanations are more
specific than a mere attribution of the behavior to the person
or situation, and that the elements of lay theories of behav-
ior consist of more concrete causal factors such as goals or
dispositions.
Some authors investigated the role of general knowledge struc-
tures in causal attribution (Lalljee and Abelson, 1983; Hilton and
Slugoski, 1986; Read, 1987; Abelson and Lalljee, 1988). Most of
them draw on Schank and Abelson’s (1977) theory and argue
that people use knowledge structures such as scripts, plans, goals,
and themes when explaining behavior. According to these models,
perceivers assimilate an observed behavior to their knowledge
structures and derive an explanation of it from their general world
knowledge. They might, for example, explain a behavior by the
plan that the actor is likely to pursue. These knowledge-based
models provide a general conceptual framework of information
processing rather than a specific model of causal explanations.
The theoretical framework proposed in the present article draws
on these models but tries to specify structures of prior knowledge
that are more specific to the process of causal explanation.
In the present article, a model is presented that emphasizes
the importance of preconceptions about causal relationships in
guiding explanations of behavior, the causal explanation network
(CEN). The basic assumption of the CEN model is that the first
step in understanding is to classify an observed behavior as a cer-
tain type of behavior, and that different types of behavior trigger
different hypotheses about the causes of the behavior. Consider,
for instance, a tennis player who wins a match. What are possible
causal explanations for this victory? The player may conclude, for
example, that she is a naturally gifted tennis player, or that she
practiced hard to be in good shape. In this example, the victory
is classified as an achievement outcome and possible explanations
are, for example, ability (natural talent in this example) or effort
(hard practice). Effort is not a plausible explanation for other
types of behavior, for example for someone’s being sad, because
we do not normally expect anybody to make an effort in order to
be sad. Rather, we would search for an external event that could
have caused the person’s sadness.
Hence, depending on the type of behavior that is to be
explained, different causal hypotheses come to mind. The CEN
model specifies these causal hypotheses. In the next section, we
outline the CEN model. Two experiments are reported that tested
predictions derived from the CEN model. The first experiment
investigated which types of behavior people differentiate and
whether causal explanations are generated according to the rules
that are specified in the CEN model (described below). The
second experiment tested the hypothesis that causal explanations
that adhere to the model are generated faster and more frequently
than explanation types that violate the rules specified in the CEN
model.
THE CAUSAL EXPLANATION NETWORK
The assumption that different types of behavior elicit different
causal explanations has been an early hypothesis in attribu-
tion research. The perceived intentionality and controllability of
behaviors turned out to be important criteria for distinguishing
behavior types (Malle, 1999, 2004, 2011). For example, it has been
shown that personal reactions such as emotions (e.g., “Mary is
afraid of the dog”) or opinions (e.g., “Bill thinks his teacher is
unfair”) are perceived as reactions to a stimulus, whereas actions
(e.g., “Peter cheats on the exam”) and achievements (e.g., “Sue
is admitted to Harvard”) are seen as being brought about by
the actor (Heider, 1958; McArthur, 1972; Hansen, 1980; Hilton,
2007). Hilton (2007) even argues that the distinction between
emotions and actions is innate in that their perception is based
on distinct, innate and hard-wired modules in the human brain.
A related distinction that also emphasizes intentionality and
controllability as important criteria for distinguishing behavior
types is that between reasons and causes. This distinction has a
long history in philosophy; relevant for current purposes are only
those approaches that discuss reasons and causes as different types
of lay explanations (Buss, 1978, 1979; for critical discussions see
Harvey and Tucker, 1979; Kruglanski, 1979; Locke and Penning-
ton, 1982). Reason explanations are explanations of intentional
behavior that refer to the agent’s reasons for acting that way, for
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FIGURE 1 | The causal explanation network (CEN) model. Arrows
indicate which factors are assumed to be causally linked in the lay theory of
behavior. The letters refer to the inference rules specified in the text.
example “Jim entered the store because he wanted to buy a book.”
Cause explanations, in contrast, are explanations of unintentional
behavior that refer to the causes that brought about the behavior
without an intervening intention, for example “Sue broke her leg
because she tripped over a tree root” (Malle, 1999).
As the basic assumption of the CEN model is that different
types of behavior elicit different types of explanations, one of its
constituents is a classification of behaviors and explanations. The
categories of such a classification should be sufficiently universal
and encompassing to be applied to the explanation of behavioral
sequences. People often ask themselves not only why a particular
behavior occurred, but also what happened before and what may
happen next. We propose a unified taxonomy to classify both
behaviors and explanations rather than two separate taxonomies.
Thus, in CEN the same set of categories serves to classify behaviors
as well as explanations.
The categories were chosen in such a way that they differ with
respect to the behavior’s perceived intentionality, and with respect
to the attributional dimensions that are traditionally assumed in
the literature (e.g., Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1985, 1986): the locus
(internal–external), stability, and controllability of the cause. We
assume that categories that differ on these dimensions are partic-
ularly useful in serving the functions of causal explanations; the
functions that are usually mentioned in the attribution literature
are understanding, predicting, and controlling behaviors and
events as well as protecting the self and social identity, for example
through self-esteem enhancement and positive self-presentation
to others (Forsyth, 1980).
The causal explanation network (CEN, see Figure 1) specifies
seven categories that are assumed to be relevant in lay causal
thinking about an actor’s behavior: (i) the actor’s goals, that
is, future states that the actor strives for; (ii) his/her enduring
dispositions, such as personality traits, attitudes, or skills; (iii)
his/her temporary states, such as emotions, evaluations, mental
states, motivational states, or bodily states; (iv) his/her actions,
that is, behaviors that are perceived as intentional and goal-
directed; (v) his/her action outcomes, that is, whether the aim of
an action is fulfilled or not, typical outcomes are achievement
outcomes; (vi) uncontrollable events, that is, events that happen
to a person and that were not intended, such as accidents; and
(vii) stimulus attributes, that is, features of the person or object
toward which a behavior is directed, such as the difficulty of an
exam that the actor wants to pass or the beauty of a picture that
the actor admires.
As described earlier, these categories are used to classify behav-
ior as well as to generate causal explanations. Furthermore, it is
assumed that these categories are mentally represented as causally
linked to each other and that people implicitly apply the following
inference rules when explaining behavior (as indicated by the
arrows in Figure 1, examples are given below): (a) actions are
caused by goals, (b) goals are caused by (higher order) goals,
(c) goals are caused by temporary states, (d) temporary states
are caused by dispositions, (e) temporary states are caused by
stimulus attributes, (f) temporary states are caused by events,
(g) outcomes are caused by actions, (h) outcomes are caused
by temporary states, (i) outcomes are caused by dispositions, (j)
outcomes are caused by stimulus attributes, (k) outcomes are
caused by events, (l) events are caused by dispositions, (m) events
are caused by (preceding) events.
The categories and inference rules have been derived from the
body of attribution research. For example, the causes that Heider
(1958) specifies in his naïve analysis of action are particularly
suited as explanations for achievement outcomes and are thus
reflected in the arrows that are directed toward outcomes in
CEN: actions (which correspond to effort in Heider’s terms),
dispositions (ability), stimulus attributes (task difficulty), and
events (luck). Lay theories of intentional actions have been ana-
lyzed in the knowledge-based approaches to attribution which
were mentioned earlier (Lalljee and Abelson, 1983; Leddo et al.,
1984; Leddo and Abelson, 1986; Read, 1987; Abelson and Lalljee,
1988). This idea has been refined by Malle (1999, 2004, 2011)
and Malle and Knobe (1997). They find that the most important
components of a lay theory—or folk concept as they call it—of
intentionality are the desire for an outcome and the belief that
the behavior leads to the outcome, both are seen as giving rise to
an intention to act. In terms of the CEN categories, beliefs refer
to temporary (mental) states, and desire for an outcome refers to
a goal. There is general agreement in the literature that people
see intentions (which correspond to goals in CEN) as immediate
causes of actions (e.g., Heider, 1958; Jones and Davis, 1965; Malle,
1999, 2011). Furthermore, research on dispositional inference
has shown that dispositions are inferred via inferences about
the target person’s intentions and motives, which correspond
to goals in CEN (Jones and Davis, 1965; Reeder et al., 2004;
Kammrath et al., 2005). Early work has shown that temporary
states (emotions, opinions) are attributed to the stimulus (Heider,
1958; McArthur, 1972).
The categories and inference rules in CEN are based on these
existing attribution theories and empirical findings. The aim
of CEN is to provide a unifying framework that can integrate
these diverse approaches and is applicable to a broader range of
attribution situations than most models. While the basic idea that
different behavior types trigger different explanations has been
proposed before, the specific set of categories and inference rules
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postulated in CEN is new. Furthermore, to our knowledge no
other attribution model has postulated the same set of categories
for classifying both behavior types and explanation types. One
great advantage of this proposition is that CEN can—with a
parsimonious set of assumptions—describe how people explain
extended behavioral sequences and construct behavioral episodes
(e.g., John is a nice guy; when he saw the old lady with her heavy
bag, he felt sorry for her and wanted to help. Thus, he carried her
bag to her home.).
THE PROCESS OF EXPLANATION
According to CEN, the explanation process begins with classifying
the behavior that is to be explained as a member of one of
these categories. The model predicts that a behavior is attributed
to those explanation types that are cognitively represented as
being causally linked to the behavior category. The same category
can serve as a behavior type in one case and as an explanation
type in another case. For example, according to inference rule
(a) intentional actions are caused by goals. According to this rule,
behavior that is perceived as an intentional action is explained by
the action’s goal. When asking why a person strives for a certain
goal, in turn, the model predicts a higher order goal (rule b)
or a temporary—for example, emotional—state (rule c) as an
explanation. The action “John calls a friend,” for example, may
be explained by his goal “he wants to invite his friend.” This
goal could be explained by a higher order goal (e.g., “John wants
to be social”), or by a temporary state (e.g., “John is bored”).
An outcome (e.g., “John fails his exam”) may be explained by
an action (e.g., “he did not study hard enough,” rule g), by a
temporary state (e.g., “he was nervous,” rule h), by a disposition
(e.g., “he is a dull person,” rule i), by a stimulus attribute (e.g.,
“the exam was too difficult,” rule j), or by an event (e.g., “bad
luck,” rule k). Uncontrollable events (e.g., “John’s basement is
flooded”) may be explained by dispositions (e.g., “John is an
unlucky fellow,” rule l), or by preceding events (e.g., “a water pipe
broke,” rule m).
As these examples suggest, the inference rules are assumed
to be transitive so that the explanation of extended behavior
sequences can be incorporated in the model. There are no causes
assigned to dispositions and stimulus attributes. Dispositions and
stimulus attributes are assumed to mark the end of a causal
search, to be particularly satisfactory explanations, and to serve as
ultimate explanations that do not raise any further questions. The
outcome-category is the one that has no consequences, because
outcomes mark the end of a behavioral sequence.
These inference rules are assumed to reflect lay conceptions
about what sorts of things may cause what other sorts of things.
They may be thought of as a cognitively represented causal syntax.
The question of whether these rules reflect “true” causal relation-
ships is not relevant for a lay theory. The aim is to describe a lay
theory which people use in their everyday lives when they give
subjective and intuitive explanations. Taken as a scientific theory
about human behavior, such folk theories might be completely
wrong. The CEN rules were derived from other attribution mod-
els (e.g., Heider, 1958; Jones and Davis, 1965; Lalljee and Abelson,
1983; Read, 1987; Abelson and Lalljee, 1988; Malle, 1999), and are
assumed to reflect common sense. Thus, they are the rules that
are empirically expected to be employed by many people. Two
experiments will be reported that test predictions derived from
the CEN model.
EXPERIMENT 1: THE STRUCTURE OF BEHAVIORS AND
FREE-RESPONSE EXPLANATIONS
Experiment 1 aimed at investigating three questions. The first
two questions address the appropriateness of the seven categories
as a description of the cognitive structure of behaviors and
explanations. The CEN model assumes that these seven categories
are used when encoding behavior as well as when generating
explanations.
The first research question of Experiment 1 is whether people
actually classify behavioral episodes in a way that corresponds to
the CEN categories. Participants were presented with descriptions
of behavioral episodes, which had been constructed in such a way
that a priori each behavior belonged to one of the categories. Par-
ticipants were asked to judge the similarity between these behav-
iors. Similarity judgments are a non-directive type of judgment
that leaves it to the judges which attributes of the stimuli they
use to evaluate similarity. The assumption is that judges base their
judgment on those attributes that are most salient or important to
them. Therefore, similarity judgments are often used in cognitive
psychology as an indirect and unobtrusive measure of cognitive
relationships (Tversky, 1977; Nosofsky, 1992). A multidimen-
sional scaling analysis of the similarity judgments was expected
to yield a configuration of the behaviors that corresponds to their
a priori assignment to the CEN categories. A secondary aspect of
the first research question is whether the presented behavior types
differ in their perceived intentionality and controllability, which
are assumed to be distinguishing dimensions of the behaviors.
The second research question is whether the CEN categories
sufficiently capture the types of explanations that people give.
That is, can explanations that are generated in an unrestricted way
be allocated to the seven categories or are there any important
categories lacking that would be needed to classify explanations?
In order to answer this question, explanations were obtained in a
free-response format and coded by independent raters according
to the seven categories.
The third research question of Experiment 1 refers to the
core prediction in the CEN model, namely, that explanations are
generated according to the postulated inference rules. That is,
when people generate an explanation, does the type of this expla-
nation correspond to a category that the CEN model assumes
to be linked to the category of the behavior? For instance, are
actions explained by goals and outcomes by actions, states, or
stimulus attributes? This question was addressed by analyzing the
relationship between the type of the presented behavior and the
explanation type of the free-response explanations.
An additional aim of this study is to further test the validity
of the CEN model by replicating two attributional tendencies
that have been reported in the attribution literature. One such
finding is that actors and observers differ in their attributions
in such a way that actors tend to focus on situational factors
when explaining their behavior whereas observers tend to see
others’ behavior as caused by dispositions. This so called actor–
observer difference has been introduced by Jones and Nisbett
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(1971); it has entered the textbooks and has been described as a
stable, robust, and well-established phenomenon (for example in
a meta-analysis by Watson, 1982). A more recent meta-analysis
casts some doubt on the pervasiveness and robustness of the
actor–observer difference: Malle (2006) found that many studies
failed to replicate the actor–observer effect and that average effect
sizes vary around 0. Nevertheless, this meta-analysis also showed
that one of the conditions under which differences between
actors and observers occur is when free-response explanations
were obtained, as in the present study. Therefore, the present
study investigated whether the actor–observer divergence can be
established when explanations are analyzed by means of the CEN
categories.
Another attributional tendency is that positive outcomes are
attributed to internal, dispositional factors, whereas negative
outcomes are attributed to situational causes (e.g., Davis and
Stephan, 1980; McAllister, 1996; Sedikides et al., 1998; for reviews
see Miller and Ross, 1975; Zuckerman, 1979). This self-serving or
positivity bias has proved as a stable and general phenomenon in
attribution research that has been found in different behavioral
domains, and for own as well as for others’ outcomes (Böhm,
1992; Duval and Silvia, 2002; Moon, 2003; for meta-analyses that
focus on the self-serving bias, i.e., on favorable attributions with
respect to the self, see Mezulis et al., 2004, as well as Campbell and
Sedikides, 1999).
The present study aimed to replicate these two attributional
tendencies by varying the perspective of the attributor as actor or
observer on the one hand, and the valence of the behavior as posi-
tive or negative on the other hand. With respect to the attributor’s
perspective, observers were expected to give more dispositional
explanations than actors, whereas actors were expected to give
more explanations than observers that refer to the three exter-
nal categories: outcomes, events, and stimulus attributes. With
respect to the behavior’s valence, potential differences between
actors and observers were, for the sake of simplicity, not consid-
ered. A positivity bias was expected for both perspectives in such a
way that internal explanations are preferred for positive behaviors
and external explanations for negative behaviors. In terms of
the CEN categories, this means that explanations referring to
goals, actions, states, and dispositions were expected to be more
frequent for positive than for negative behaviors, whereas expla-
nations referring to outcomes, events, and stimulus attributes
were expected to be preferred for negative behaviors.
METHOD
Both experiments reported in this article conformed at all stages
with the ethical principles of the German Research Council
(DFG); informed consent was obtained from all participants.
Participants
Fifty undergraduate psychology students volunteered to partici-
pate. They received course credit for their participation. Their age
ranged from 19 to 47 years (M = 24.9); 78% were female.
Behavior descriptions
Twenty behavior descriptions were used. The behavior descrip-
tions corresponded to four of the seven categories: actions,
outcomes, states, and events. Goals, dispositions and stimulus
attributes were not presented as behavior descriptions, because
they do not constitute observable behaviors. States were fur-
ther distinguished in emotions and evaluations (cf. McArthur,
1972). Hence, five behavior types were presented: action, out-
come, state-evaluation, state-emotion, and event (behavior type
manipulation). For each type, two desirable and two undesirable
behaviors were presented (valence manipulation). Furthermore,
the behavior descriptions were formulated either in the first
or in the third person (perspective manipulation). Half of the
participants received all behavior descriptions in the first person
(actor perspective), the other half of the participants in the
third person (observer perspective1). The items read as follows:
(a) action-positive: “<I carry/Matthew carries> an old lady’s
bag to her home,” “<I donate/Cloe donates> a large sum of
money to Greenpeace”; (b) action-negative: “<I baste/Michael
bastes> a passer-by,” “<I tell my friend/Ruth tells her friend>
a lie”; (c) outcome-positive: “<I pass/Andy passes> the inter-
mediate exam,” “<I get the job for which I/Warren gets the
job for which he> applied”; (d) outcome-negative: “<I do
not get the apartment that I/Kathy does not get the apart-
ment that she> wanted,” “<I fail/Harry fails> the drivers test”;
(e) state-evaluation-positive: “<I like my/Julie likes her> new
bike,” “<I like my friend’s/Nick likes his friend’s> new hair
cut”; (f) state-evaluation-negative: “<I find my friend’s/Monica
finds her friend’s> cloths tasteless,” “<I think my/Ben thinks
his> teacher is unfair”; (g) state-emotion-positive: “<I am very
happy with my/Sheila is very happy with her> holiday flirt,”
“<I am pleased with my/Becky is pleased with her> birth-
day gift”; (h) state-emotion-negative: “<I am/Sue is> angry
at the car driver,” “<I am/Mary is> afraid of the dog”; (i)
event-positive: “<I receive/Tom receives> a trip to Hawaii as
a gift,” “<I win/Steve wins> in a lottery”; (j) event-negative:
“<My/Chuck’s> basement is flooded,” “<My/Sally’s> wallet was
stolen.”
Design and procedure
Three independent variables were manipulated by providing the
behavior descriptions: (a) behavior type with five levels (action,
outcome, state-evaluation, state-emotion, event); (b) the valence
of the behavior (positive vs. negative), and (c) the perspective of
the attributor (actor vs. observer). Behavior type and valence were
manipulated within, perspective between subjects.
The experiment was run in groups of three to four partici-
pants who worked independently on their tasks. Upon arrival,
they were instructed that they were to read descriptions of a
number of situations and that they should imagine either that
they were in that situation themselves (actor perspective) or
that they observed someone who was in that situation (observer
perspective). They were randomly assigned to the two perspective
conditions.
1The original stimulus material was in German, as were the first names used
in the behavior descriptions. Ten male and 10 female common first names
were used that were randomly assigned to the 20 behavior descriptions. When
translating the behavior descriptions into English, we decided to also use
English first names; they are as close to the German originals as possible.
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Dependent measures
Each participant received the 20 behavior descriptions three
times, each time completing one of three judgmental tasks. The
order of the behavior descriptions was randomized for each
participant and each judgmental task. Participants completed the
following three judgmental tasks.
First, free-response explanations for the behavior descriptions
were obtained. Participants received a booklet in which each
behavior description was written on top of a separate page.
Participants were asked to explain in free-response format why
they thought the behavior probably occurred. Participants were
asked to answer briefly and spontaneously and to generate exactly
one explanation for each behavior item.
Second, participants judged the similarity of the behavior
descriptions. The behavior descriptions were each printed on
a separate card. Participants were asked to sort the behavior
descriptions into piles of similar behaviors.
Third, three evaluative ratings were obtained in a question-
naire. Participants evaluated the intentionality, controllability,
and desirability of each behavior. Each rating was given on a rating
scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much).
Additional measures were obtained that are beyond the scope
of this paper and will not be reported here. They relate to the
following constructs: importance of explanation types, informa-
tion search, behavioral predictions. None of these measures yields
results that would lead to different conclusions than are drawn
here.
Coding of free-response explanations
The free-response explanations were allocated to explanation type
categories by independent raters. That is, raters judged for each
explanation whether it referred to a goal, an action, an outcome,
an event, a state, a disposition, or a stimulus attribute, or if it
did not fit in any of these categories. For instance, an explanation
such as “Matthew carries the old lady’s bag, because he wants to
help her” was coded as a goal, an explanation such as “Matthew
is a nice/helpful person” was coded as a disposition. Three raters
coded all explanations that were given from participants in the
actor condition, and another three raters coded the explanations
from observer-condition participants. Thus, each rater coded
500 explanations (25 participants in each perspective condition
gave one explanation for each of 20 behavior descriptions). The
interrater agreement between the three raters of a condition as
measured by Fleiss’ Kappa is κ = 0.62 for the three raters in the
actor condition and κ = 0.63 for the three raters in the observer
condition. According to Landis and Koch (1977) these values can
be considered to reflect very good agreement. An explanation was
assigned to an explanation type category if at least two of the three
raters agreed on that category. Explanations that were assigned
to different categories by all three raters were not used in further
analyses; in this way, 91.3% of the explanations were assigned to
an explanation type.
Construction of a similarity matrix
The similarity sortings were used to construct a pairwise similar-
ity matrix of the behavior descriptions. For each pair of behavior
items, the number of participants who had sorted that pair
into the same pile was used as a measure of the similarity of
that pair.
RESULTS
Evaluative ratings
The evaluative ratings served as manipulation checks. The a priori
behavior types differ significantly with respect to their perceived
intentionality, F(4,45)= 118.5, p< 0.001, η2= 0.913. The pattern
of means is in the expected direction, the judged intentionality
of the behavior decreases from actions (M = 2.24) via outcomes
(M = 2.01), state-evaluations (M = 1.02), and state-emotions
(M = 0.74) to events (M = 0.59).
The behavior types also show the expected effect on perceived
controllability, F(4,45) = 169.86, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.938. The
pattern of the means is similar to that for intentionality. The
judged controllability decreases from actions (M = 3.55) via
outcomes (M = 2.60), state-emotions (M = 1.77), and state-
evaluations (M = 1.73) to events (M = 1.18).
Positive and negative behaviors significantly differ in their
perceived desirability, F(1,48) = 1090.59, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.958.
Positive behaviors are judged as much more desirable (M = 3.58)
than negative behaviors (M = 0.36). Thus, the valence manipula-
tion was successful.
In sum, the analysis of the evaluative ratings renders two
main results. First, the behavior types systematically differ with
respect to their intentionality and controllability. The order of
the behavior types is as hypothesized. Actions are perceived as
the most intentional and controllable, followed by outcomes and
temporary states (evaluations and emotions); events are the least
intentional and controllable behavior types. Second, valence of
the behaviors was successfully manipulated.
The structure of behaviors
In order to analyze the perceived structure of the behaviors,
the similarity matrix that was derived from the sorting task
was subjected as input to a non-metric multidimensional scal-
ing analysis (Borg and Groenen, 2005). The actor and observer
conditions yield identical configurations (the pairwise distances
of the behaviors in the two resulting configurations correlate with
r = 0.90). Therefore, the configuration for the entire sample
will be reported. The two-dimensional solution yields a good fit,
stress = 0.175 (non-metric MDS, stress formula 1); it is shown
in Figure 2. A third dimension (fit for the three-dimensional
solution is stress = 0.06) provides some differentiations between
the behaviors that will be pointed out below.
The distance of the behaviors in the configuration reflects
their similarity. That is, the closer two behaviors are located the
more participants decided that these two behaviors are similar
and placed them into the same pile. The configuration shows
that the two behaviors that are of the same type and valence are
grouped closely together and are thus perceived as very similar.
The negative emotions are interspersed with negative actions in
this figure, but they are apart on the third dimension that is not
displayed. The horizontal axis separates the situational factors
(outcomes, events) that are located on the left from the personal
factors (actions, emotions, evaluations) on the right. The vertical
axis separates positive behaviors at the bottom from negative
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FIGURE 2 | Multidimensional scaling solution of behaviors based on
similarity sortings, Experiment 1. act, action; emo, emotion; eval,
evaluation; out, outcome; evnt, event; +, positive behavior; −, negative
behavior.
behaviors at the top. Interestingly, negative emotions are located
close to actions, to negative as well as to positive actions, whereas
positive emotions are close to positive evaluations and relatively
far apart from actions. This seems to imply that negative emotions
are much more strongly associated with behavioral impulses, thus
actions, than positive emotions.
This multidimensional scaling analysis supports the CEN cat-
egories as a cognitive taxonomy of behaviors. The behaviors that
are assumed to belong to one category in CEN were perceived
as similar by participants, which supports the assumption that
participants perceived them as members of the same category.
The cognitive structure of the behaviors is also influenced by
the valence of the behaviors. This might be expected, as the
perceived intentionality is assumed to be a basis for the cognitive
structuring of behaviors and positive behaviors generally appear
more intended than negative behaviors.
Free-response explanations
The Behavior Type × Explanation Type contingency table
(Table 1) shows that 91.3% of the open-ended explanations could
be classified according to the CEN explanation types. Thus, the
CEN categories cover a large proportion of the explanation types
generated in free-response explanations by participants.
The contingency table also shows that the type of the generated
explanation depended on the type of the behavior that was
explained, χ2(24) = 482.79, p < 0.001. The relationship between
behavior type and explanation type was further analyzed by asym-
metric correspondence analysis (Greenacre, 1984, 1993). This
procedure is similar to principal components analysis and pro-
vides a graphical representation of the relationship between the
rows and columns of a contingency table. The two-dimensional
solution accounts for 77.1% of the variance; it is depicted in
Figure 3. Behavior types (upper case labels in Figure 3) are
represented in standard coordinates, explanation types (lower
case labels) in principal coordinates (Greenacre, 1984). The plot
shows that participants to a large extent obeyed the postulated
inference rules. That is, they preferably generated those explana-
tion types that are assumed to be causally linked to the behavior
category according to the CEN model. Each quadrant depicts a
typical relationship. Actions were mainly explained by goals, and
somewhat less typically by dispositions and temporary states.2
Evaluations and emotions were mainly explained by stimulus
attributes, events by other events, and outcomes by prior actions
and outcomes.
One aspect of these findings is noteworthy. The CEN model
assumes a direct link to actions only from goals. Participants
explained actions not only by goals, but also by temporary states
and dispositions of the actor. This finding does not contradict
CEN. According to CEN, states and dispositions are indirectly
linked to actions as remote causes; thus, they may well serve as
explanations for actions. The finding is noteworthy, because it
indicates that people give proximate as well as distal causes as
explanations. The role of such causal chains in explanations will
be addressed in the second experiment.
There is only one deviation of the findings from the CEN
model: Behavioral outcomes were explained by previous out-
comes. When formulating the CEN model, it was assumed that
outcomes mark the end of a behavioral episode and would
therefore constitute some terminal point in explanatory activities.
Participants, however, apparently constructed sequences of such
behavioral episodes when explaining outcomes. For instance,
when explaining why Warren gets the job for which he applied,
they gave explanations such as “because he received good grades,”
or “because he made a good impression during the interview.”
Apparently, achievement outcomes give rise to future achieve-
ment outcomes in lay reasoning.
Attributional biases
Table 2 shows the distributions of the free-response explanations
across the explanation types for the actor–observer difference
(upper half of Table 2) and for the positivity bias (lower half).
The attributor’s perspective affected the type of explanation
that was generated, χ2(6) = 51.6, p < 0.001. This effect was
particularly pronounced for the two explanation types disposi-
tion and stimulus attribute: Observers gave more dispositional
2Note that correspondence analysis analyzes row and column profiles of a
contingency table, rather than absolute frequencies. The distribution of the
explanations for the behavior type action illustrates this point. In absolute
numbers, goals are not the most frequent explanation type given for actions;
temporary states, for instance, are more frequent than goals. However, state
explanations are more frequent than goal explanations for all behavior types.
When looking at the distribution of goal explanations across behavior types,
actions are the behavior type that elicits by far the most goal explanations.
That is why goal explanations are located closer to action behaviors than state
explanations in the correspondence analysis configuration. We believe that this
feature of correspondence analysis quite adequately represents the structure
of this contingency table. Goal explanations may not be the most frequent
type of explanation for actions in absolute terms, but they are the most typical
explanation type for actions.
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Table 1 | Number of free-response explanations by explanation type and behavior type (Experiment 1).
Explanation type
Behavior type Goal Action Outcome Event Temporary state Disposition Stimulus attribute Sum
Action 28 3 2 19 60 38 34 184
Outcome 2 12 48 34 21 47 14 178
Evaluation 3 1 9 10 20 40 102 185
Emotion 6 0 5 42 30 12 80 175
Event 0 12 24 98 27 9 21 191
Sum 39 28 88 203 158 146 251 913
A total of N = 1000 free-response explanations were generated across all behavior descriptions and all participants.
FIGURE 3 | Asymmetric correspondence analysis plot of free-response
explanations, Experiment 1. Behavior types are in standard coordinates,
explanation types in principal coordinates. Percentage of inertia: Dimension
1 = 50.43%, Dimension 2 = 26.65%. Behavior Types are depicted in upper
case letters, explanation types in lower case letters. ACT, act: action; EVAL:
state-evaluation; EMO: state-emotion; OUT, out: outcome; EVNT, evnt:
event; goal: goal; state: temporary state; disp: disposition; stim: stimulus
attribute.
explanations than actors, whereas the reverse holds for explana-
tions that refer to stimulus attributes. These two differences were
expected. However, actors and observers were also expected to
differ with respect to the other two situational explanations (i.e.,
outcomes and events). The results show that actors and observers
did not differ in all sorts of situational explanations, but only in
specific types of situational attributions. These results confirm
the actor–observer hypothesis as it was originally formulated
by Jones and Nisbett (1971). They claimed that observers tend
to attribute behavior to the actor’s stable dispositions, whereas
actors are inclined to see their behavior as caused by situational
requirements. Jones and Nisbett (1971) already hypothesized
that actors and observers do not generally differ with respect to
personal and situational attribution, but with respect to specific
internal causes (i.e., dispositions) and specific external causes (i.e.,
situational requirements). Possibly, stimulus attributes are the
type of external factor that qualifies as a situational requirement,
more so than uncontrollable events and outcomes.
Table 2 also shows that positive and negative behaviors elicited
different types of explanation, χ2(6) = 50.6, p < 0.001. Goals,
actions, outcomes, and dispositions were more frequent explana-
tions for positive than for negative behaviors. Events and tem-
porary states, in contrast, were much more frequently given as
explanations for negative than for positive behaviors. There was
no difference in the number of stimulus-attribute explanations
generated for positive and negative behaviors.
Many studies on the positivity bias have focused on the attri-
bution of success and failure and have investigated attributions
only with regard to the internal–external dimension (Campbell
and Sedikides, 1999; Mezulis et al., 2004). Again, the CEN expla-
nation types provide a more differentiated picture. It does not
hold true that positive behaviors are generally attributed to inter-
nal and negative behaviors to external causes. Most of the internal
explanation types (goal, action, disposition) are preferred for
positive behaviors, but temporary states as internal attributions
are preferred for negative behaviors. And events are the only
external explanation type that is preferred for negative behaviors;
outcomes are more frequent for positive behaviors, and stimulus
attributes are equally often named as explanations for positive and
negative behaviors. Uncontrollable events and temporary states
were preferred to explain negative behaviors. These two explana-
tion types seem particularly suited to avoid blame, which supports
a motivational interpretation of the positivity bias (Zuckerman,
1979). Hence, controllability and stability may be as important
aspects of the positivity bias as the locus of the attribution on
the internal–external dimension. Grove et al. (1991) even found
that success and failure attributions differed only with respect
to stability and controllability, and not at all with respect to
their locus. Hence, the study of the stability and controllability
dimensions may deserve more attention than they have so far
received in the positivity bias literature (for a similar argument
see Mezulis et al., 2004).
DISCUSSION
This experiment demonstrates that the seven categories postu-
lated in the CEN model cover the cognitive concepts that are
relevant in the lay theory of behavior. This is demonstrated by
two aspects of the findings. First, when asked to sort behaviors
according to their similarity, participants sorted them according
to their theoretically assumed behavior types. Hence, the CEN
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Table 2 | Actor–observer difference (top) and positivity bias (bottom) in free-response explanations (Experiment 1): distribution of
free-response explanations across explanation types.
Explanation type
Goal Action Outcome Event Temporary state Disposition Stimulus attribute Sum
Actor–observer differences
Actors 26 11 37 102 71 47 164 458
Observers 13 17 51 101 87 99 87 455
Positivity bias
Positive behaviors 23 23 57 80 54 87 126 450
Negative behaviors 16 5 31 123 104 59 125 463
categories seem to capture the perceived similarity of behaviors.
Remember that similarity judgments are non-directive. We gave
no hint as to which attributes of the behaviors should be used to
judge their similarity. Apparently, the CEN categories provide a
structure that corresponds to the mental representation of behav-
iors and that is used spontaneously when evaluating the similarity
of behaviors in an explanatory context. It may be argued that the
presented behaviors were constructed so that they corresponded
to the CEN categories, which may have restricted the diversity of
the behaviors and thus the range of attributes that participants
could use as a basis for their similarity judgments. However, apart
from the general problem that any selection of behaviors implies
some restriction of range, we believe that the behaviors still
differed on many other attributes than the ones conforming to the
CEN model (e.g., sex of protagonist in the observer condition) so
that the result that participants’ similarity sortings corresponded
to the CEN categories can be seen as supportive evidence for
the CEN model. Second, most of the explanations generated
in free-response format correspond to one of the postulated
explanation types. These types obviously cover the concepts that
people use when thinking about explanations. Taken together,
these two results support the assumption that the CEN cate-
gories are used for encoding behavior as well as for generating
explanations.
The findings support not only the assumption that the seven
concepts are used in explanatory activities, but also that the
search for causes proceeds along the inference rules that are
assumed in the CEN model. The free-response explanations
that were generated by participants to a large degree conformed
to the explanation types that the CEN model predicts for a
given behavior type: Actions were explained by goals, temporary
states, and dispositions; outcomes were explained by preceding
actions; temporary states, namely evaluations and emotions, were
explained by stimulus attributes; and events were explained by
antecedent events. The only unexpected result is that outcomes
were frequently explained by previous outcomes.
There is also evidence for two attributional biases, namely
actor–observer differences and positivity bias. With respect to
the former, results show that actors prefer dispositional explana-
tions, whereas observers prefer explanations that refer to stimulus
attributes. With respect to the positivity bias, negative behaviors
are by far more frequently attributed to events and temporary
states than are positive behaviors. Goals, actions, outcomes, and
dispositions, in contrast, are more frequently cited as explana-
tions for positive than for negative behaviors. Thus, the findings
replicate these two biases, which supports the validity of the
CEN categories as explanation types. Furthermore, since the CEN
categories classify explanations on a more detailed level than
most other attribution models, they allow us to consider these
attributional biases on a more differentiated level. For the actor–
observer difference, it is not situational factors in general but
stimulus attributes in particular that are preferred by actors.
Similar results were found by Malle et al. (2007) who also studied
the actor–observer asymmetry my means of free-response expla-
nations. These explanations were coded in two ways: On the one
hand with respect to the global person-situation dichotomy and
on the other hand concerning differentiated factors such as the
actor’s reasons (i.e., beliefs and desires) and mental states. Across
six studies, the evidence for the actor–observer divergence was
scattered and inconsistent on the global person-situation level,
but consistently found on the differentiated level. Hence, even
though the pervasiveness of the actor–observer asymmetry has
been put into question on the traditional global level, it seems
to exist on more differentiated levels. Analyzing explanations on
such a differentiated level helps to specify the exact nature of
the phenomenon. The question arises which level best reflects
how people explain human behavior. Interestingly, Malle et al.
(2007) did not find consistent evidence for the actor–observer
difference when they looked at a very specific level, namely, when
they investigated whether observers give more trait explanations
than actors. Traits are but one type of stable disposition; possibly,
this level was too differentiated to capture the phenomenon.
For the positivity bias, the results of the present study indicate
that negative behaviors particularly evoke explanations that refer
to uncontrollable events and temporary states. Thus, controllabil-
ity and stability of the attributed cause need to be considered in
addition to its locus when investigating the positivity bias.
Several links assumed in the CEN model, however, did not
show in the data of Experiment 1. For example, most of the
assumed causes of outcomes were not given as explanations (i.e.,
temporary states such as nervousness, dispositions such as ability,
stimulus attributes such as task difficulty, and events such as
luck). This does not necessarily mean that these explanation types
would not be regarded as proper explanations for outcomes by
participants. Note that they were restricted to mentioning only
one explanation for each behavior. They might have given such
explanations had they had the opportunity to give more than one
explanation. This issue will be addressed in Experiment 2 where
participants were asked to try to find explanations of all types for
each behavior.
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It turned out that actions were explained not only by goals,
but also by temporary states and dispositions. Participants gave
causes that are assumed to be directly linked to the behavior
category as well as indirect causes that are linked to the behavior
via intervening causes. This is in accord with CEN, because the
links are conceived as transitive so that distant causes can serve as
explanations. An action such as “Matthew carries an old lady’s
bag to her home” may be explained by the actions goal (e.g.,
“Matthew wants to help her”), by a state that may have initiated
the goal (e.g., “Matthew felt sorry for the old lady”), or by a
personal disposition that predisposed Matthew to experience such
states and have such goals (e.g., “Matthew is a helpful person”).
All causes that are linked to the behavior are assumed to serve
as potential explanations. Presumably, a person who names a
remote cause as an explanation implies the intervening steps. For
instance, we would assume that a person who explains Matthew’s
carrying the bag with his dispositional helpfulness implies that
his general helpfulness made him want to help the old lady in that
particular situation.
The effects of such causal chains and their lengths on the
process of generating explanations will be investigated in Exper-
iment 2: Are causes that are directly linked to the behavior
generated more easily and faster than remote causes?
EXPERIMENT 2: RESPONSE LATENCY FOR GENERATING
EXPLANATIONS
The CEN model specifies causal paths of varying lengths between
two categories. For example, there is an immediate connection
with path length 1 from goal to action, from state to action path
length is 2 (via goals), and from disposition to action path length
is 3 (via states and goals). Three is the maximum path length
in the model. There are also category pairs with no direct or
indirect connection. For example, there is no causal link going
from action to event. That is, an action–explanation should not
be appropriate in lay causal thinking if the behavior in question is
an event.
If the causal search proceeds along the postulated paths, the
ease of generating an explanation of a particular type should
decrease with the length of the path that links that explanation
type to the behavior type. If there is no path at all between
the required explanation and the behavior, it should be very
difficult or impossible to generate such an explanation, because
it contradicts the lay theory of behavior. In order to test this
assumption, the response latency was measured for people to
generate an explanation of a particular type for a specific behavior.
Participants were required to produce a certain type of expla-
nation for a behavior item that was presented on a computer
screen. As in Experiment 1, each behavior item corresponded to
one of the categories. Then, a signal indicated which of the seven
categories should be generated as an explanation. Participants
had 10 s to generate an explanation of the required type. We
measured whether an explanation could be given within these
10 s, and if so, the response latency for generating the explanation.
The number of generated explanations was expected to decrease
and the response latency to increase with increasing path length;
response latency should be particularly long and explanations
especially few if there is no link between behavior and explanation
according to CEN.
METHOD
Participants
Twenty-two undergraduate psychology students from the same
population as in Experiment 1 volunteered to participate. They
received course credit for their participation.
Behavior descriptions
Eighteen behavior descriptions were presented that were in part
taken from Experiment 1. Three behavior descriptions were
presented for each of the following categories: goal (e.g., “Cloe
wants to change her profession.”), action (e.g., “Sheila invites
her neighbors for dinner.”), outcome (e.g., “Monica passes the
intermediate exam”), event (e.g., “Mary receives an inheritance”),
temporary state (e.g., “Becky is pleased with her birthday gift”),
and disposition (e.g., “Tom is an honest person”). In contrast
to Experiment 1, goals and dispositions were also included as
behaviors because they constitute important comparison cases.
According to CEN, participants should find generating explana-
tions easy for goals but difficult for dispositions. All items were
formulated in the third person and described positive behaviors.
Design and procedure
The independent variable behavior type was manipulated with
six levels (goal, action, outcome, event, state, disposition). Each
behavior description was presented seven times, once in com-
bination with each of the explanation types. Explanation type
thus constituted the second independent variable (with seven
levels: goal, action, outcome, event, state, disposition, stimulus
attribute). Participants were asked to provide an explanation of
the behavior that was of the indicated type. Since there was no
reference to a stimulus in the dispositional behavior descriptions
(e.g., “Tom is an honest person”), the explanation type stimulus
attribute was omitted for these behavior items. Each participant
performed 123 trials, the order of which was randomized for each
participant.
The experiment was run in individual sessions. Before working
on the explanation generation task, participants performed a
training phase in which they learned the explanation types. The
explanation types were explained to participants and they learned
one-word keywords for them (GOAL, ACTION, OUTCOME,
EVENT, STATE, PERSONALITY, ATTRIBUTE)3. Then, they were
asked to assign example explanations to the explanation types and
were corrected by the experimenter. The practice examples were
unrelated to the items used in the explanation generation task.
After the training phase the explanation generation task began.
The procedure to measure the response latencies for expla-
nation generation was adopted from a study by Sanitioso et al.
(1990) who measured response latencies for the activation of
auto-biographic memories. This part of the experiment was run
3The original German keywords were: ZIEL, HANDLUNG, HAND-
LUNGSERGEBNIS, EREIGNIS, ZUSTAND, PERSÖNLICHKEIT, MERK-
MAL. We chose “Persönlichkeit” (personality) for disposition in order to select
words that are part of common everyday language.
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on a computer. Each trial began with a behavior description
that appeared on the upper part of the computer screen. The
participant hit a key on the computer keyboard when he or
she had read the behavior description. Then a prompt appeared
on the lower part of the computer screen that indicated which
of the seven explanation types was required on that trial. The
explanation types were prompted by the one-word keywords that
the participants had learned. Participants were instructed to find
an explanation of the required type as quickly as possible, at the
longest within 10 s. Simultaneously with the explanation-type
prompt a bar appeared on the screen that indicated the remaining
time by decreasing in length as the 10 s passed. When an explana-
tion of the required type had occurred to the participant, he or she
hit a key. After hitting the key the participant said the explanation
aloud. The explanations were tape recorded. If the participant
could not give an explanation, an acoustic signal indicated when
the 10 s had elapsed. That was the end of the trial. The participant
started the next trial by hitting a key. Participants performed some
practice trials before beginning with the actual task. Every 25 trials
they were asked if they needed a short break.
Two dependent measures were taken for each trial: Whether
the participant gave an explanation within 10 s or not, and if so,
the response latency in millisecond (i.e., the time between the
onset of the explanation-type prompt and the participant’s key
stroke which indicated that the participant had thought of an
explanation).
Control measures
Participants performed two additional tasks that were designed
to measure control variables: the general speed of reaction for
hitting a key and the time required to recollect the meaning of
the explanation-type prompts. Furthermore, the time needed to
read the behavior descriptions was measured. Since none of the
control analyses altered the results, they will not be reported.
Elimination of invalid trials
After the experiment participants’ recorded explanations were
analyzed in order to identify invalid trials, that is, trials on which
participants made mistakes. Invalid trials were eliminated before
data analysis. Trials were eliminated for the following reasons:
(a) the explanation was of a wrong type; (b) the type was correct,
but participants gave a consequence rather than an explanation
(e.g., a response such as “Warren will start the job” as an expla-
nation of the behavior item “Warren gets the job for which he
applied”); (c) for dispositional behaviors, participants sometimes
did not give a causal explanation, but a behavioral indicator of
the disposition (e.g., an explanation such as “Tom always tells
the truth” for the behavior item “Tom is an honest person”);
(d) the explanation was a verbatim repetition of the behavior
item; (f) accidental key stroke (as indicated by comments made
by the participant). Eighty-five percent of the trials (2306 out of
2706) were classified as correct (i.e., participants gave either an
explanation of the required type or no explanation).
Path length
From the combinations of behavior types and explanation types
a repeated measures factor path length was constructed. Each
Table 3 | Number of explanations and response latencies for varying
path lengths (Experiment 2).
Measure No link Path
length 1
Path
length 2
Path
length 3
Number of
explanationsa
M 0.64 2.05 2.22 2.38
SD 0.35 0.42 0.62 0.62
Response
latency (ms)
M 6623 5450 5590 5245
SD 1085 1268 1483 1680
aNumber of explanations may vary from 0 to 3, because three behavior
descriptions for each behavior type were presented.
combination between a behavior type and an explanation type
corresponds to a particular path length from the explanation to
the behavior. The factor path length has four levels: path length
1 (e.g., from goal to action), path length 2 (e.g., from state to
action), path length 3 (e.g., from disposition to action), and
no-link (e.g., from action to event). For each participant, the
mean response latency and the mean number of explanations
for each path length were computed by averaging the trials that
corresponded to behavior–explanation combinations with the
respective path length.
RESULTS
Both dependent measures were analyzed by means of a one-way
repeated measures analysis of variance with the factor path length.
The cell means are shown in Table 3.
Number of explanations
The effect of path length on the mean number of explanations
was significant, F(3,19) = 164.77, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.963. As was
expected, the number of explanations that could be generated was
much smaller for the no-link condition than when a path exists
between behavior and explanation. Surprisingly, when a path
exists, the number of explanations increased with path length.
The increases from path length 1 to path length 2, F(1,21)= 3.66,
p= 0.21, and from path length 2 to path length 3, F(1,21)= 2.68,
p = 0.36, were not significant, but the difference between path
lengths 1 and 3 was significant, F (1,21) = 7.08, p = 0.045
(p values after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons).
The number of explanations had been expected to decrease rather
than increase with path length—this point will be taken up in the
discussion.
Response latency
There was also a strong effect of path length on response
latency, F(3,19) = 12.11, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.657. As hypothe-
sized, response latency was much longer if no path exists than
when a path links the explanation type to the behavior type.
Unexpectedly, the path lengths 1 to 3 did not significantly dif-
fer from each other, F(2,20) = 1.49, ns; response latency had
been predicted to increase with increasing length of existing
paths.
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DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 2 demonstrate that the no-link combi-
nations of behavior and explanation type contradict a lay causal
theory of behavior. The number of explanations is much smaller
and the response latency much longer in these cases than when a
path exists from explanation to behavior. Participants could not
easily generate explanation types that are not causally linked to
the behavior type in the CEN model. In the very few instances
in which they could provide such an explanation, they required
much longer time.
Two aspects of the results were unexpected. The generation
of explanations had been assumed to become more difficult as
path length increases. Consequently, it had been predicted that
the number of explanations would decrease and response latency
would increase with path length. However, all explanation types
that are linked to the behavior can be generated equally fast,
independently of the path length of the connection. And the
number of explanations even increases with path length, so that it
almost seems as if it becomes easier, not more difficult, to generate
an explanation when path length increases.
A plausible interpretation of these findings is that the genera-
tion of an explanation is the result of two different processes. One
process is the activation of causal hypotheses for a given behavior.
This can be thought of as a process of spreading activation
(Anderson, 1983b) that starts from the encoded behavior and
proceeds along the paths of the network. Apparently, this process
is very fast, so that all causes that are linked to the behavior
are activated more or less simultaneously—or the differences are
so small that our procedure did not detect them. Malle and
Holbrook (2012) conducted a study that can be interpreted in
terms of the CEN model and whose results suggest that the
activation takes longer with increasing path length. Using a similar
procedure to Experiment 2, these authors studied the speed and
the likelihood with which four types of inferences are drawn
from verbal or visual behavior descriptions: the behaviors inten-
tionality, the actor’s desires (i.e., goals), the actor’s beliefs (e.g.,
what the actor was thinking in the situation), and the actor’s
personality traits. They found that intentionality inferences and
desire inferences were fastest, belief inferences were slower, and
personality inferences were slowest. These types of inferences
roughly correspond to the CEN categories goal (intentionality,
desire), state (belief), and disposition (personality), which in
the CEN model are causally linked to actions with path lengths
1, 2, and 3, respectively. Note that Malle and Holbrook (2012)
measured the time it takes to draw an inference of the respective
type, which is a more basic process than generating a causal
explanation of the type. This is indicated by the average response
latencies, which are much shorter in their study than in ours.
Possibly, Malle and Holbrook’s (2012) procedure measured the
activation process more directly so that increases in response
latencies with longer path length showed up.
The second process may be the selection of a cause as an
explanation. Presumably, this selection process is what the num-
ber of generated explanations measured. Our data suggest, then,
that a cause is more easily selected as an explanation if it is an
indirect rather than a direct cause of the behavior. The selection
process may be guided by conversational principles, apart from
the plausibility of the cause. Even if people think that a cause is a
plausible one, they may not be willing to explicitly tell it; because
they find it too self-evident to be mentioned. Grice (1975) argues
that people follow conversational maxims. For example, they want
to be informative. That is, they do not want to tell something that
they believe the listener already knows. Some authors have applied
this reasoning to attributions and explanations (e.g., Hilton,
1990, 2007; Slugoski et al., 1993; Hilton and Slugoski, 2001)
and maintain that people will not mention explanations (for
example in a questionnaire when participating in a psychological
experiment) that they consider as already known or self-evident.
Maybe direct causes are too easily inferred and therefore appear
self-evident. For example, a goal may be an obvious cause for an
intentional action (Malle, 1999). The more interesting cause that
is worthwhile mentioning may be the condition that initiated the
goal, such as a temporary state or a personal disposition. Self-
evidence of a cause may decrease with the length of the causal
chain that links the cause to the behavior. That would lead to a
preference for selecting indirect causes compared to direct causes.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
A model called CEN is proposed that incorporates the knowledge-
based and hypothesis-driven aspects in the process of causal
explanation. The results of two experiments support the basic
assumptions of this model. People start an explanation problem
with hypotheses about potential causes. These potential causes
are derived from the lay theory of behavior; they depend on the
type of the behavior that is to be explained. The CEN model
specifies the lay theory of social behavior. It consists of two
parts: a cognitive taxonomy and inference rules that link the
categories of this taxonomy. The taxonomy distinguishes seven
cognitive categories that are assumed to be used for both behavior
encoding and explanation generation: goals, intentional actions,
action outcomes, temporary states, dispositions, uncontrollable
events, and stimulus attributes. The inference rules are assumed
to reflect causal relations between these categories. Experiment
1 demonstrated that perceived behaviors are cognitively encoded
according to the categories, and most explanations generated
in free-response format corresponded to one of the categories.
Hence, the seven categories postulated in the CEN model seem
to reflect the cognitive concepts that make up the lay theory
of behavior. Furthermore, two classical attribution tendencies,
actor–observer differences and positivity bias, were replicated
in Experiment 1, which further corroborates the validity of the
categories as explanation types. Furthermore, most of the infer-
ence rules were supported in Experiment 1 where free-response
explanations were obtained.
Experiment 2 demonstrated that causes that are assumed to
be linked to the behavior type are generated faster and more
frequently as explanations than causes that are assumed not to
be linked to the respective behavior category. This suggests that
combinations between a behavior and explanation type that are
unrelated in the CEN model are not compatible with the lay causal
theory of behavior.
Experiment 2 additionally showed the effects of the path
length of the connection between explanation and behavior. All
linked explanations were generated equally fast, irrespective of the
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 139 | 12
Böhm and Pfister Lay causal explanations
path length, but the number of explanations increased with path
length. This result suggests that all linked causes are activated as
causal hypotheses, and that an explanation is selected from this set
of hypotheses. A criterion for selecting a cause as an explanation
may be found in conversational principles such as the desire to
be informative and not to tell anything obvious (Hilton, 1990,
2007). An explanation may be more interesting and worthwhile
telling when it refers to a remote, indirect cause rather than to a
direct one.
Approaches that deal with lay theories of causal attributions
have often been seen as competing with covariational attribution
models (Lalljee and Abelson, 1983; Ahn et al., 1995; Ahn and
Kalish, 2000; Malle, 2011). However, it seems that these two
approaches describe two complementary parts of the attribution
process and may thus be integrated (Sutton and McClure, 2001;
Rose et al., 2011). Lay theoretical approaches focus upon people’s
prior knowledge whereas covariation models focus upon the
processing of covariational information. The attribution process
always consists of both deductive and inductive components
(Young, 1995). Their relative importance may vary depending
on the amount of prior knowledge and available information.
If we learn that somebody fails an exam and have a strong
preconception that this person is lazy, we may not seek any
further information in order to explain the failure. On the other
hand, if we receive compelling covariation information (e.g., that
everybody else also failed), this information may override our
preconceptions. Furthermore, in the absence of any beliefs about
a plausible cause, people will not be able to infer causation even
when they possess covariation information. Lay theories provide
causal hypotheses and covariation information may serve to select
one of the potential explanations for a behavior. Rose et al. (2011)
showed that covariation information is used more if it is infor-
mative for testing hypotheses about concrete causal explanations.
Sutton and McClure (2001) demonstrated the interplay of lay
causal conceptions and covariation information when intentional
actions are explained. The covariation principle can be seen as
another selection principle besides conversational rules.
In sum, the present studies suggest a two-stage process of
attribution: The activation of causal hypotheses and the selection
of one or more of the causes as an explanation. The CEN model
specifies which hypotheses about potential causes will be activated
depending on the type of behavior that is to be explained. The
model describes the activation part of the process, or, in Trope
and Higgins (1993) terms, the what (i.e., the content) of causal
attribution. The selection part refers to the cognitive processes
that lead to a causal judgment, that is, to the how of causal attri-
bution (Trope and Higgins, 1993). The selection process operates
on the set of potential causes that have been activated. Numerous
attribution principles have been proposed in the literature that
are candidates for selection principles. Two broad classes seem
to be especially important: Those that are based on additional
information, most notably the covariation principle, and those
that are based on social processes such as conversational maxims.
The relationship between behavior type and explanation type
can be bidirectional. On the one hand, the behavior type deter-
mines which explanation types will be considered. For example,
if Sally hits Bill, this will appear as an intentional action and
a plausible explanation is that Sally was angry with Bill. On
the other hand, the explanation for a behavior determines its
meaning. If we learn, for example, that Sally stumbled and acci-
dentally hit Bill, this explanation re-categorizes the behavior as an
unintentional event. Hence, the behavior type affects the explana-
tion type and the explanation type signals a behavior type. This
assumption is supported by Malle (1999). He distinguished rea-
son explanations (which mostly correspond to goal explanations
in the present framework) and cause (i.e., non-reason causal)
explanations. He found that intentional behavior evokes reason
explanations and unintentional behavior cause explanations, and
also, that the same behavior seems intentional when explained by
a reason but unintentional when explained by a cause.
People may engage in varying amounts of information pro-
cessing when explaining behavior. They begin the causal search
by encoding the behavior as a certain type of behavior, which
activates hypotheses about potential causes. These hypotheses
may serve as explanations and the process may stop at this point.
If they are motivated to do so and have the opportunity, they may
search for further information. The present model assumes that
people start with searching information that allows them to test
their causal hypotheses. If none of these hypotheses is supported
by the information, they may try to re-categorize the behavior
and test the new hypotheses that arise from the new behavior type
(Abelson and Lalljee, 1988).
Most attribution models consider the abstract attribution
categories person, stimulus, and situation that have been intro-
duced by Kelley (1967, 1973). Some authors have argued that
lay explanations are more concrete and specific than these broad
categories (Lalljee and Abelson, 1983; Leddo et al., 1984; Read,
1987; Hilton and Knibbs, 1988; Malle, 1999, 2011; Malle et al.,
2000; Kammrath et al., 2005). For instance, “Jack didn’t study”
and “Jack is unintelligent” are both person attributions for a
failure in an exam, but with different inferential implications, so
that they will presumably be distinguished in lay attributional
thinking. However, it is an unresolved question which differ-
entiations within the person, stimulus, and situation should be
made.
The CEN model offers such a division into more concrete cate-
gories. An interesting question is whether there is a preferred level
of abstraction at which people generate explanations (Keil, 2006).
Such basic levels (Rosch, 1978) have originally been proposed
for object categories, but have also been identified for cognitive
structures in social domains, such as everyday activities (Rifkin,
1985), personality traits (John et al., 1991), and emotions (Shaver
et al., 1987). The basic level is generally assumed to be at that level
of abstraction where objects are categorized in such a way that
objects that are homogeneous with respect to relevant features are
grouped together in one category, whereas different categories are
heterogeneous with respect to such features. The relevant features
of explanations may be assumed to be the traditional attribution
dimensions such as intentionality, locus, stability, and control-
lability. The CEN categories are supposed to bundle causes that
are homogeneous with regard to these dimensions and are thus
equivalent as explanations. Hence, they may be candidates for a
basic level of attribution. Causal thinking should then proceed on
the level of concrete actions, states, dispositions, and so on. An
www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 139 | 13
Böhm and Pfister Lay causal explanations
experiment that hints in that direction was performed by Smith
and Miller (1983). They found that judgments of intention and
of the actor’s traits were made faster than causal ascriptions to
the person or situation. Presumably, inferences with respect to
the actor’s intention and traits were made spontaneously, with
the assignment of the inferred cause to the abstract categories of
person and situation requiring additional time. In a similar vein,
Reeder et al. (2004) found that perceivers spontaneously ascribed
specific motives to a target person and that such specific motives
were more influential on dispositional inferences than global
attributions to the person or situation. Hence, spontaneous causal
inferences seem to take place on a level that is more concrete
than the traditional tripartite classification of person, stimulus,
and situation attributions; the CEN categories aim to capture this
preferred level.
In sum, the proposed causal explanation model constitutes
a return to Heider’s (1958) original aim of analyzing lay causal
theories that people use when explaining behavior. It provides a
valuable complement to traditional attribution models such as the
covariation model by adding the what to the how of social attri-
bution. The model specifies the content of causal attributions and
describes how people understand their own and others’ behavior,
which shapes social perception and social interaction and is thus
one of the most fundamental aspects of social functioning.
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